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Abstract—While the application of IoT in smart technologies
becomes more and more proliferated, the pandemonium of its
protocols becomes increasingly confusing. More seriously, severe
security deficiencies of these protocols become evident, as time-
to-market is a key factor, which satisfaction comes at the price
of a less thorough security design and testing. This applies
especially to the smart home domain, where the consumer-
driven market demands quick and cheap solutions. This paper
presents an overview of IoT application domains and discusses
the most important wireless IoT protocols for smart home, which
are KNX-RF, EnOcean, Zigbee, Z-Wave and Thread. Finally, it
describes the security features of said protocols and compares
them with each other, giving advice on whose protocols are more
suitable for a secure smart home.
Index Terms—IoT, Security, Smart Homes, Protocols, KNX-
RF, EnOcean, Zigbee, Z-Wave, Thread
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Although wireless sensor connections offer several ways to
increase our productivity in many fields such as smart home,
smart production or smart transportation, it also introduces
some risks to be aware of. The usage of a wireless physical
communication, which allows attackers easier interception
of communications, together with the Internet of Things
(IoT) [1] [2] or Web of Things (WoT) [3] also leads to
unprecedented opportunities for attackers to reveal confidential
information and to manipulate data. It is crucial to find efficient
and effective methods to counteract such attacks. Otherwise,
all the benefits of the IoT will be forfeit.
In order to address these challenges, first, a deep security
analysis of the existing technologies is needed to help discover
the root causes as well as find analysis techniques that allow
verifying the security of the system. Moreover, other aspects
also have to be considered to reach a secure environment.
In some cases, there are no resources to implement the
needed secure methods, for example, on sensor nodes with
limited resources that operate in adverse environments in
which very efficient methods have to be provided. On the
other hand, security is not only a hardware method. For this
reason, software attacks, for example attacks against memory
consumption, have to be always in scope to avoid them.
An analysis about the security on the IoT would be huge
and it can not be done just in one publication. Because of
this fact, our research is focused on a security analysis of
the main wireless protocols in the smart home domain. This
publication has three main parts. The next section gives an
overview of the different domains that can be found in the
Internet of Things. Section III describes the way in which
the sensors can be connected as well as a brief presentation
of the selected wireless protocols. The subsequent Section IV
provides a security analysis of each protocol and Section V,
eventually, shows the conclusion and outlook of our research.
B. Related Work
Security and privacy are not simple tasks and include several
different issues to carry out in an IoT domain, the article in
[4] gives us an overview of the most common challenges in
this field. On the other hand, Granjal et al. [5] present an
exhaustive analysis of the security and privacy of each layer
of the OSI model according to the existing protocols and their
implication in the general IoT domain. Focusing on the smart
home domain topic, an extended analysis of the security is
detailed in [6]. It contains an in-depth report of the main
aspects of this area, such as the most common threats and
good practices as well as a brief protocol analysis and security
implications of using of cloud platform on smart homes. One
step beyond is given from [7], in which the authors not only
describe the main security and privacy threads, but introduce
an algorithm to secure each situation. Finally, they test them in
a real-environment with successful results. Although, it seems
that these issues only concern researchers, the conclusions
of the research [8] present that one of the main problems
customers find to implement smart home solutions is security
followed by inflexibility, costs, and poor manageability, which
indicates that it is also an important point for customers.
Unfortunately, sometimes the theoretical research is not
enough and a practical research is needed. For example, [9]
introduces a study about the Google Nest1 and the Nike+
Fuelband2, in which both hardware and software are analyzed.
Another interesting approach is given in [10], in which the
security and privacy are tested in different IoT demos, such as
a small light system. It describes detailed analysis and depicts
1https://nest.com/
2https://www.nike.com/nike-plus
the possible risks for each scenario. Moreover, a new kind
of devices to take into account are the low energy devices
in which a security system has to be applied but is con-
strained by an extremely low power usage as the article [11]
describes. [12] shows why a smart home scenario cannot be
considered as an isolated system by proving it can be exploited
by using an external mobile application.
Along with this related work, we have seen numerous
security and privacy threads and also some possible solutions,
but not an extended security comparison of the available
protocols that can be used in the smart home domain, which
is the main focus of this paper.
II. IOT APPLICATION DOMAINS
Figure 1 displays an overview of the (smart) IoT application
domains considered in this paper, including the communica-
tion protocols used in each respective area.
Fig. 1. Venn diagram of IoT application domains and included protocols
A. Smart Home
The smart home market is getting more and more dy-
namic and, according a Smart Home Customer Survey of
Deloitte [13], in 2018 one million households could already be
smart in Germany. According to that study, the main interests
in Smart Home are closely linked to more comfort and safety,
followed by savings on heating and electricity costs. The
main barriers for customers are on the one hand the costs
and on the other the concerns regarding data protection and
data security. One important recommendation for the market
players is to address security and privacy adequately and make
it transparent to the customer. Within this paper we give an
overview of the most common wireless protocols used in the
Smart Home domain and an analysis of the defined security
measures.
B. Smart Production
Recent reports [14] [15], describe key issues for the next
generation of smart production analytic services. Relevant
applications are: digital performance management (including a
data-driven mindset and integration across previously isolated
functions); predictive maintenance (including integration of
diverse data sets and using, e.g., advanced self-learning algo-
rithms); yield, energy, and throughput optimization (including
integration of process control with other data); next-level
automation (including improvements in sensor technology and
demand planning); and digital quality management (including
the use of new sensing technologies and semi-automated
quality control). In Smart Production, wireless sensor networks
will play a key role for increasing the flexibility of a data
driven production lifecycle. Furthermore, for such a connected
environment, it is clear that we should deal with cyber security
issues described in this paper.
C. Smart Transportation
Smart transportation is becoming one of the biggest domains
of the IoT. The implementation of the Controller Area Network
(CAN) [16], that is commonly used in the automation control
together with new protocols and communication technologies
such as the 5G [17] or IoT-Narrow Band (IoT-NB) [18],
opens new possibilities to exchange information. These new
technologies are able to give smart transportation the neces-
sary packet delay and data transmission rate. Moreover, new
hardware implementations, specifically designed to make the
right decision as fast as possible, provide a new key tool for
the future of the autonomous vehicles. In this future they will
have to be able to not only communicate with other cars or
services, but process all information of the environment in real
time to make the right choice. In consequence, the protection
of all sensible information, as well as communications, has to
be a mandatory point to ensure the safety and privacy of users.
D. Smart Energy
In the energy domain, several standards are available for
different areas ranging from generation, transmission, distribu-
tion and distributed energy resources to the customers, which
may be also producers themselves, making them so-called pro-
sumers. A good overview of these standards is available at the
International Electrotechnical Commission Website3. Regard-
ing communication networks, the whole range beginning from
home area networks, located at the customer, over the field
area networks at the distribution level and wide area networks
at transmission level are represented. That means wireless
standards like 2G/3G/4G, WiMAX, WLAN, WirelessHART,
ISA100.11a, ZigBee, Z-Wave, 6LoWPAN, LoraWan, Sigfox,
as well as wired standards such as Ethernet, profibus, profinet,
modbus or PLC are used for connectivity. Frequently, smart
3http://smartgridstandardsmap.com/
energy gateways are used to consolidate communications,
having their own security requirements [19].
III. WIRELESS SMART HOME PROTOCOLS
Before going deep into the protocols in IoT, it is highly
recommended to start on Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI) layer model which gives a better understanding of the
implementation of the explained protocols. The OSI layer
model [20] provides a standard architecture to define network
communication with the following layers:
• Layer 1 - Physical: Information of bits through a physical
medium;
• Layer 2 - Data link: Controls errors in transmission
between two adjacent nodes by using frames;
• Layer 3 - Network: Adds the concept of routing in which
a frame is able to reach a destination beyond adjacent
nodes;
• Layer 4 - Transport: Reliable transmission of data, in
which new optional capabilities can be added such as
retransmission or flow control;
• Layer 5 - Session: Manages the sequence and flow of
events;
• Layer 6 - Presentation: Manages the syntax processing
of messages to be used in the application layer such as
the encryption/decryption;
• Layer 7 - Application: The layer where end-user appli-
cations are implemented.
Another approach is given in the TCP/IP model [21], [22],
which is frequently used for internet communications because
it is a simplified vision of the OSI layer model by only
using four layers. The figure 2 shows a representation of both
versions
Fig. 2. Overview of the OSI model on the different protocols
In the field of the IoT, [23] proposes an IoT stack as the
combination of four main components: the physical layer, the
IoT platform, the communication protocols/technologies and
the application layer. Instead, [24] suggests an architecture
based on three main layers: the perception layer, the network
layer, and the application layer. Following these approaches,
this publication is focused on the network layer in which sev-
eral protocols and communication technologies are described
as well as the security and privacy aspects of each of the
selected domains.
Another important point to consider is the way in which
devices are connected to each other on a wireless domain.
Although there are several topologies, two main types can be
differentiated:
• Centralized or star: There is central node o hub which is
the responsible one for managing communications with
other nodes of the network and the outside;
• Decentralized or fully connected: All nodes are connected
to other network nodes; this kind of topology is not
efficient when the network is bigger, because the com-
munication effort grows exponential with the number of.
A middle ground between the topologies above is the mesh
topology, in which several nodes are able to communicate with
each other through the communication between intermediary
nodes. The figure 3 depicts an example of a mesh network,
which also may include other topologies such as the following:
• Ring: All nodes make a loop in which each node is
connected to two nodes; the information goes through
each node until it reaches the destination node;
• Bus: All nodes are connected to a backbone and com-
munications and messages go through it in which all
nodes receive all messages; if the backbone cable fails,
all networks fail;
• Line or point-to-point: Is the simplest network topology,
which consists of the connection between two endpoints.
This research is focused on the wireless protocols which are
available in the smart home domain. These requirements reject
the protocols: X10 [25], DALI [26] [27], and LonWorks [28]
that mainly use power line and twisted pair as on the phys-
ical layer. It is also focused on the security implications of
protocols on the network and transport layers of the OSI
model. According to that, OMA Lightweight M2M (OMA
LWM2M) [29] and OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA) [30]
were also discarded because are implemented beyond the
transport layer. Then, the chosen protocols are the following:
A. KNX-RF
Developed in 1991, KNX4 is one of the main protocols in
the Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), with
a huge number of compatible devices available on the market.
Moreover, in 2006, it was accepted as an open standard by the
ISO/IEC 14543-3 specification. The protocol is based on the
OSI model and covers the data link, network, and transport
layer. In this paper, we focus on KNX Radio Frequency (RF),
although the protocol is not limited to this physical medium
and is able to use other transmission mediums such as the
twisted pair, power line, and ethernet (KNXnet/IP). The used
band for the wireless transmission is located in the industrial,
4https://www.knx.org/
Fig. 3. Network topologies in this publication: a) Star b) Fully connected c) Mesh
scientific and medical (ISM) bands, specifically at 868 MHz
and 2.4 GHz and is able to reach a maximum range up to 150
meters. The maximum data rate transmission is up to 16.385
kbps.
The nodes are connected through tree topologies: line, tree,
and star. A KNX network is based on areas and lines. Each
area can include a maximum of 15 lines where the devices are
connected as end nodes. The maximum number of devices that
can be addressed is 65k, which can communicate with each
other without any master device because KNX is a peer-to-
peer system.
B. EnOcean
Although it was patented in 2001, in 2012 it became an
international standard (ISO/IEC 14543-3-10). Its main fea-
ture is the wireless power supply which allows devices be
independent of a battery to work, because they receive their
energy from the wireless signal. Th EnOcean standard involves
the three lowest layers of the OSI model; physical, data, and
network. To ensure a better integration, the EnOcean alliance
provides the EnOcean Equipment Profiles (EEP) layer which
is located in the application layer to reach interoperability
between different type of products and suppliers with this
standard. It uses the ISM bands as transmission frequency;
868 MHz, 315 MHz, and, since May 2017, 2.4 GHz through
Easyfit5. EnOcean uses a mesh topology in which all nodes
communicate with each other. The signal range is up to 300
meters in free field and 30 meters inside a building and the
maximum data rate is 125 kpbs.
C. Zigbee
Zigbee was developed in 2001 and updated by the Zig-
bee PRO specification in 2007. The latter is fully backward
compatible and includes some improvements, such as a better
security. Unique about Zigbee is the implementation of con-
crete specifications for different scenarios. Two examples are
Zigbee LightLink that is widely used on smart light systems
5https://www.easyfit-solutions.com/
(i.e Philips Hue6), or Zigbee Green Power, which is able to
work with battery-less devices in a similar way EnOcean does.
Zigbee can be used with three topologies; star, tree and mesh
in which a maximum of 65k nodes are supported. Zigbee
operates in the ISM bands, 913 MHz, 868 MHz and 2.4
GHz and the devices range is limited to 10-100 meters. The
maximum provided data range is up to 20kbps within 913
MHz and 868 MHz bands and 250 kbps for the 2.4 GHz
band. Zigbee uses the IEEE 802.15.4 standard as a physical
and data link layer.
D. Z-Wave
Developed in 2001, Z-Wave is mainly focused on wireless
lightweight and low-latency transmission data. The newest
update of the protocol, called Z-Wave Plus, was given in 2013
and adds some improvements such as better battery life as well
as wireless range. Unlike Zigbee or EnOcean, Z-Wave is not
a standard and its development is controlled by the Z-Wave
Alliance7 which involves over 600 companies including big
players of the IoT sector like Siemens or Huawei. Z-Wave
uses a mesh network with the number of connected devices in
a network limited to up to 232 nodes. Z-Wave involves the four
lower layers of the OSI models, physical, data link, network
and transport. Moreover, the implementation of the physical
and data link layers has been included as standard G.9959 by
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It is able
to work on the common industrial frequency 828 MHz at EU
markets and 908 MHz as a part of the ISM bands with a
maximum range of up to 30 meters. Finally, the maximum
provided data rate is up to 100 kbps.
E. Thread
Thread8 is a standard that has been specially designed for
wireless device-to-device communications. It can be used on
small and large networks together with low-power devices.
One of the strongest advantages of the stack is that there is no
6http://www2.meethue.com/
7https://z-wavealliance.org/
8https://threadgroup.org/
single point of failure. If a slave device depends on a master
device that is unavailable, the child is able to independently
select another master device. This is possible because it uses
a mesh network topology together with 6LoWPAN, in which
every node can act as master node and there is no limit
to connected nodes due to the usage of IPv6. 6LowWPAN
is also used in the version 4.2 of Bluetooth9 Low Energy
(BLE) through the Internet Protocol Support Profile [31],
which enables Bluetooth Smart sensors to access the Internet
directly via 6LoWPAN connectivity. The Thread procotol
implementation is given in the layers number 3 and 4 of the
OSI layer model and uses the IEEE 802.15.4 standard in the
layers 1 and 2, which allows a data rate of 250 kbps.
IV. PROTOCOL SECURITY
This section contains an analysis of the security measures
taken by the protocols from Section III. On this behalf, it
describes the cryptographic methods (algorithms and opera-
tion modes) for assuring confidentiality, authenticity, integrity
and replay protection for each protocol. It further gives an
overview of protocol- and implementation-related security
issues for each of the protocols.
A. KNX-RF
The KNX protocol itself defines no security measures
in KNX, apart from less-than state-of-the-art, plain text-
transmitted passwords [32]. However, KNX has been extended
with KNX Data Security, providing encryption, authentication
and integrity checking using AES-CCM with 128 bits, as well
as a sequence number as a counter. The key exchange is via
pre-shared secret, with a project specific tool key derived from
a unique Factory Device Set up Key (FDSK), which is the
PSK [33]. Despite some time being in use, a detailed security
analysis of the KNX Security extensions is still not available
[34]. An earlier analysis of a draft state of KNXnet/IP Secure,
however, found numerous attack vectors and security service
shortcomings [35].
B. EnOcean
EnOcean provides authentication, integrity checking, en-
cryption and replay protection [36]. For encryption, the proto-
col provides two cryptographic means: AES-CBC and variable
AES (VAES). The EnOcean specification defines for AES-
CBC in its schematic description that “The initialization
vector has all bytes set to 0”. A constant initialization vector,
however, is regarded insecure [37]10, therefore using AES-
CBC in EnOcean is discouraged. VAES, on the other hand,
can be seen as a variant of the counter mode (CTR). The
counter in this setup consists of a specified Public Key and
a Rolling Code (RLC). The latter should start with a random
number (also called nonce) [37]. For message authentication
and integrity checking, an AES-CMAC is used, which is
9https://www.bluetooth.org
10An all-zero initialization vector is practice with CBC-MAC, which,
however, is regarded insecure outside the CCM (see Section IV-C)
generally regarded secure under the conditions that no all-
zero payloads occur and that the AES key will change after
at most 248 messages [37]. The aforementioned RLC could,
apart from being part of VAES, also be a part of a secured
EnOcean packet and, in conjunction with the CMAC, as
such be used for replay protection. Therefore, when using
EnOcean, it is recommended to use a nonce-starting RLC
within the packet for replay protection, VAES for encryption
and CMAC for authentication and integrity checking. All of
these (optional) parameters (including a RLC initialization
value) are exchanged in a teach-in mode. This mode allows
using a pre-shared key, which should be used, as otherwise the
exchange will take place unencrypted, including the session
key used later on.
C. Zigbee
Zigbee builds on IEEE 802.15.4 (see Section III-C) and
is therefore subject to security issues concerned with that
protocol, which are out of this paper’s scope. Zigbee’s security
measures reside, following its architecture, on its network
(NKW) and application (APS) layers (see Figure 4). The
combined encryption and authentication relies on AES-CCM*,
which provides both services, and is currently regarded secure
while integrity and replay protection rely, in conjunction
with the former, on a message integrity code and a frame
counter [38]. The protocol uses a 802.15.4-derived security
level scheme with eight levels (0-7), of which the lower four
operate unencrypted and the upper four are encrypted. For
each half, the lowest level (0 and 4, respectively) provides
no authenticity and integrity checking, while the upper ones
include increasingly sized (32, 64, 128 bits of length) message
integrity codes (MIC) [39]. For integrity-checking only (1-3),
it uses an AES-CBC-MAC, which is discouraged outside of
AES-CCM [40]. Therefore, only the levels 5-8 can assure
authenticity and integrity. Zigbee uses two types of keys:
network keys and link keys. The former are mainly used for
broadcasts and capable or securing a Zigbee message at the
NKW layer, but have to be known to the entire network, while
the latter may be used for end-to-end security, but only at APS
layer. The network key may be pre-shared or transmitted by a
trust center, which may have to occur unencrypted, opening
a temporary vulnerability [38]. Both versions of message
security add auxiliary headers and, if applicable, a MIC at their
respective layer, thus resembling an encapsulating security
payload. The verification of the link (APS layer) key is secured
using a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC), where
the hash function is a Matyas-Meyer-Oseas construction with
AES-128 as block cipher11 [39].
Zigbee can operate in a centralized or distributed manner.
The former uses a trust center for controlling security (in par-
ticular authorizing new devices and handling key distribution).
In distributed Zigbee networks, the devices of network form
a mesh topology, where each router can act as a parent to
11Using the same key and block size of 128 bytes thereby eliminates the
need for key compression
Fig. 4. Stack of each protocol according to the TCP/IP Model
new devices, while if a network key is pre-commissioned in
some form, there is no additional authorization. Furthermore,
application link keys, used for securing application layer data,
are not established in Zigbee relaying that task to a higher
level protocol [39]. This lack of specification leaves room for
insecure behaviour.
In the centralized model, a Zigbee network, from a security
perspective, forms a star topology with the trust center as
a hub. In this setup, despite using strong (cryptographic)
building blocks, there are some severe security flaws, par-
ticularly the assumption of key secrecy. Essentially, ZigBee
provides two methods of key establishment, pre-shared keys
and the usage of a publicly known Default Trust Center Link
Key, which is common practices for ease-of-interoperability
reasons12. This could compromise initial key exchange pro-
cedures using a built-in fallback mechanism in the standard
[41]. Also, low-cost IoT devices may not have a secure key
storage, so extracting a network key could be a trivial task.
This is even more an issue in the lighting networks using the
Zigbee Light Link (ZLL) specification, as ZLL devices should
relay on NWK security13. Using the touchlink feature, devices
can furthermore be forced to associate with a rouge controller
from several meters distance [41]. In this setup, also denial
of service attacks, like factory resets and permanent device
disconnects are possible [42]. Furthermore, a formal analysis
of the Zigbee protocol from 2012 yielded indications of vul-
nerabilities to multiple authentication attack types, specifically
timing attacks, that lead to the disclosure of Zigbee’s default
key [43].
D. Z-Wave
Z-Wave provides confidentiality, authentication and replay
attack protection utilizing a distinct Security Layer within
its Security Command Classes. Within the latest revision,
Zigbee exhibits two classes: Security 0 (S0) for lightweight
and Security 2 (S2) for stronger security. The latter is divided
12Specified with the value ZigbeeAlliance09
13Besides the fallback, there is also a publicly leaked master key globally
securing network key exchange on all ZLL certified devices.
into three subclasses: S2 Access Control, S2 Authenticated and
S2 Unauthenticated. All of these classes use AES-128 encryp-
tion. To secure key exchanges, S2 uses Elliptic Curve Diffie
Hellman (ECDH) schemes and must support Curve25519,
with a public key length of 256 bits. This length conforms
with the recommendations of the German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) [44]. The curve itself is currently
regarded secure [45], although recently a side-channel attack
against a specific implementation has been discovered [46].
S0 is intended for use with legacy devices, not capable of
enforcing S2 security. In S0, the network key is shared by all
devices in a network (similar to Zigbee, see Section IV-C).
This is not the case in S2, where each subclass has its own
network to prevent a compromised low-security class device
from compromising higher-security class ones. Technically,
S2 access control and authenticated are equivalent, while
S2 unauthenticated lacks client authentication capabilities. S2
Encryption and Authentication are provided by AES-128 in
CCM mode, while integrity checking and replay protection
rely on an AES-128-CMAC and Pre-Agreed Nonces (PAN)
with next-nonce derivation functions. So far, there are no
known security flaws in the protocol itself. However, there
are examples of successful examples of of attacks against
specific implementations. For instance, a Z-Wave door lock
implementation has been able to be forced to overwrite its
shared network due to the lack of an important state validation
check [47].
E. Thread
As with Zigbee, Thread uses a network-wide key as
network-level protection [48]. This key is used to secure pack-
ets via AES-CCM and is exchanged via a variant of juggling
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (J-PAKE), based on P-
256 elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman14 key exchange (called EC-
JPAKE). As this key is known by all devices, the protocol ad-
ditionally recommends application layer protection. Therefore,
14While there is no clear evidence, there is distrust against NIST elliptic
curve standards due to possible backdoors [49]. P-256 is a NIST-standardized
elliptic curve.
it relies on Transport Layer Security (TLS) [50] and Datagram
Transport Layer SecurityRFC6347 (both version 1.2). These
protocols provide full security services and are well prolif-
erated. These protocols are also used for the commissioning
and join processes. There are, however, more or less secure
configurations, therefore standardized advice for configuring
these protocols should be adhered to [51]. Using full end-
to-end security via TLS or DTLS, however, might have a
negative impact on performance and not all small embedded
devices might be capable thereof. As compromising one device
might, if TLS or DTLS is not used consequently, compromise
potentially the whole network or at least parts thereof, this
circumstance poses a severe security problem.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper described the most important IoT protocols for
smart home applications in general and more specifically from
a security perspective. From the five considered protocols
(Zigbee, EnOcean, Z-Wave, KNX-RF and Thread), all have
encryption and/or authentication/integrity checking services
defined, funded on AES with 128 bits (see Table I), and apart
from EnOcean, all of them at support the CCM block cipher
mode for combined encryption and integrity checking. The
latter uses a CBC and a Counter mode variant, where the
specification has room for improvement. For the Zigbee pro-
tocol, there are several security analyses that revealed blatant
vulnerabilities (especially, but not limited to the decentralized
mode of operation). Thread is aware of the weakness of
sharing a symmetric network key and tries to compensate this
by using TLS-based end-to-end security, which, however, may
prove difficult for large networks in practice and may also be
challenging for small embedded devices. Detailed analyses of
the finalized KNX security services are still lacking, although
an evaluation of a draft version of these has revealed a number
of security flaws. Z-Wave is also yet not well explored, as it
was proprietary for a long time before becoming a standard.
However, so far only attacks on implementations, not on
the protocol itself are known. Z-Wave is, however, of the
protocols in this paper, the one using the strongest security
building blocks, utilizing a nonce-based counter and, with S0
and S2 together with its subcategories, a security class-based
architecture, plus a secure key exchange method based on
elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman. Also on Diffie-Hellman relies
the Thread protocol although on a less trusted curve, while
all other protocol rely on less practical or secure method as
pre-shared or default keys to secure the key exchange.
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